Abstract:

The social sciences face a replicability crisis. A key determinant of replication success is statistical power. We assess the power of political science research by collating over 16,000 hypothesis tests from about 2,000 articles. Using generous assumptions, we find that the median analysis has about 10% power and that only about 1 in 10 tests have at least 80% power to detect the consensus effects reported in the literature. We also find substantial heterogeneity in tests across research areas, with some being characterized by high power, but most having very low power. To contextualize our findings, we survey political methodologists to assess their expectations about power levels. Most methodologists greatly overestimate the statistical power of political science research.

Abstract:

In countries with well-developed welfare state systems, it is often claimed that racial or ethnic minorities impose a heavy burden on social assistance programs without contributing to public goods. In this study, we consider the attitudinal effects of anecdotal reports of tax cheating by minorities. We conduct survey experiments in France and the United States to assess if people react more harshly to tax fraud perpetrated by members of a minority rather than the majority group. We find no evidence that minority status affects judgments and perceptions about tax fraud, including among those on the right end of the political spectrum. Tax fraud is considered unacceptable regardless of the culprit's origin.

Abstract:

Governments routinely offer deals to companies accused of white-collar crimes, allowing them to escape criminal charges in exchange for fines or penalties. This lets prosecutors avoid costly litigation and protects companies’ right to bid on lucrative public contracts, which can reduce the likelihood of bankruptcies or layoffs. Striking deals with white-collar criminals can be risky for governments because it could affect the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. This article explores the conditions under which the general public supports leniency agreements. Building on theoretical intuitions from the literature, we identify three characteristics that could affect mass attitudes: home bias, economic incentives, and retribution. We conduct a survey experiment in the United States and find moderate support for leniency agreements. Whether the crime occurs on US soil or abroad does not affect public opinion, and the number of jobs that would be jeopardized by criminal prosecution only has a small effect. Instead, survey respondents become much more supportive of a deal when it includes criminal charges for the corporate managers who were personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. In the court of public opinion, punishing a handful of individuals appears to matter more than saving thousands of jobs

Abstract:

In late 2017, the first unified Republican government in 10 years enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which cut taxes for corporations and the wealthy. Why did so many citizens support a policy that primarily benefited people richer than them? The self-interest hypothesis holds that individuals act upon the position they occupy in the income distribution: richer (poorer) taxpayers should favor (oppose) regressive policy. Associations between income and policy preferences are often inconsistent, however, suggesting that many citizens fail to connect their self-interest to taxation. Indeed, political psychologists have shown compellingly that citizens can be guided by partisan considerations not necessarily aligned with their own interests. This article assesses public support for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study as well as contemporaneous ANES and VOTER surveys to replicate our analyses, we show that self-interest and partisanship both come into play, but that partisanship matters more. Personal financial considerations, while less influential than party identification, are relevant for two groups of individuals: Republicans and the politically unsophisticated.

Abstract:

In many countries the incumbent party is free to call an early election. This gives them an advantage over opposition parties. But this decision can also backfire. In the present paper, we examine voters’ reactions to a snap election held despite a fixed election date, resistance by opposition parties, and a global pandemic. We conduct a survey experiment during the 2021 Canadian federal election campaign to assess whether voters are influenced by information about the fixed election law and the argument that the election call was opportunistic and unnecessary. While some respondents, particularly partisans of the Liberal Party, the incumbent party, moderately respond in a negative way to new information, our treatments overall do little to influence views about the snap election. However, negative attitudes toward the election call are a decisive consideration for many voters, inflicting an electoral cost to the Liberal Party which likely deprived it from a legislative majority.

Abstract:

In a seminal article published in 2003, Blais et al. demonstrated that local candidates mattered for about 5 per cent of voters in the 2000 Canadian federal election. This study's reliance on a single election raises external validity concerns. We replicate Blais et al.'s original analyses on four elections from 2000 to 2008 using a decade's worth of data from the Canadian Election Study. The local candidate effect first uncovered by Blais et al. is not specific to a single election. Local candidates are a decisive consideration for about 5 to 8 per cent of voters outside Quebec and for about 2 to 5 per cent of voters in Quebec.

Abstract:

An important body of literature shows that citizens evaluate elected officials based on their past performance. In the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election, the conventional wisdom in both media and academic discourse was that Donald Trump would have been a two-term president absent an unprecedented, global force majeure. In this research note, we address a simple question: did exposure to COVID-19 impact vote choice in the 2020 presidential election? Using data from the Cooperative Election Study, we find that Trump’s vote share decreased because of COVID-19. However, there is no evidence suggesting that Joe Biden loses the election when no voter reports exposure to coronavirus cases and deaths. These negligible effects are found at both the national and state levels, and are robust to an exhaustive set of confounders across model specifications.

Abstract:

The SARS-CoV-2 virus was first identified in Wuhan, China, in late December 2019, and it quickly spread to many countries. By March 2020, the virus had triggered a global pandemic (World Health Organization, 2020). In response to this crisis, governments have implemented unprecedented public health measures. The success of these policies will largely depend on the public's willingness to comply with new rules. A key factor in citizens’ willingness to comply is their understanding of the data that motivate government action. In this study, we examine how different ways of presenting these data visually can affect citizen's perceptions, attitudes and support for public policy.

Abstract:

Undocumented immigrants contribute to the US economy by participating in the labor force, paying taxes, and starting businesses. They do so under constant fear of deportation and while being barred from government assistance programs. Nevertheless, misconceptions about how undocumented immigrants affect the job market and public finance persist, exacerbating animus and hindering policy reforms. Across three survey experiments and three national samples of Americans, I assess two strategies for promoting inclusion and shifting policy preferences: correcting information and perspective-getting narratives. Both yield positive effects among Democrats and especially Republicans, although anecdotal accounts of “hard-working” individual immigrants prove especially effective. These findings suggest information in narrative form can be more conducive to opinion change than objective facts alone, which has important implications for how immigration reform advocates might attempt to persuade the mass public.

Abstract:

Over the last decade, a prominent experimental method---the conjoint design---has been used widely by migration scholars to understand how immigrant characteristics shape individual attitudes toward them. We collate replication files for all published and unpublished conjoint experiments where participants are asked to rate or choose between hypothetical immigrant profiles with randomized attributes. We review 71 studies spanning 1,181,338 immigrant profiles with 21 attributes, evaluated by 112,100 survey respondents from 32 countries. Meta-analyses reinforce well-established findings: sociotropic economic concerns, cultural threats, humanitarian considerations, and procedural factors all influence evaluations. Moreover, we move beyond past work in two important ways. First, we find surprisingly little evidence of cross-attribute heterogeneity, suggesting conjoint experiments may not be particularly well-suited for understanding if and how individuals base their preferences on specific attribute combinations. Second, we demonstrate people greatly differ in their decision-making depending on their priors on immigration: anti-immigrant respondents prioritize cultural similarity to a greater extent than pro-immigrant respondents, who tend to be more favorable toward refugees and immigrants from non-Western, non-Christian, and developing countries. Thus, in addition to synthesizing an extensive and influential literature, this meta-reanalysis sheds new light by explaining discordant findings and identifying areas for future research.

Abstract:

The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. To explore this question, we took a sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018 in criminology, demography, economics and finance, management, marketing and organisational behaviour, political science, psychology, and sociology. For one claim of each study, at least five re-analysts were invited to independently re-analyze the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. Only 31% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report. Even with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator did not go above 56%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, only 34% of the studies remained analytically robust, meaning that all re-analysts reported evidence for the originally reported claim. Using a more liberal definition of robustness produced comparable result (39% when >80% re-analysis agreement with the original conclusion defined analytical robustness). This explorative study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research cannot be assumed to be robust to alternative — similarly justifiable — analyses. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty. 

Abstract:

The share of immigrants comprising the electorate will increase in the coming decades. While mass partisan-ideological sorting has been studied extensively, whether and how immigrants sort remains unclear. Across 14 samples of Latinx, Asian, Black, and white immigrants (N = 57,677), we consistently observe partisanship-ideology correlations twice as large among naturalized immigrants (d = 0.4) than non-citizens (d = 0.2). Indeed, naturalized immigrants exhibit levels of sorting akin to Anglo whites, the most polarized segment of the mass public. This suggests naturalized immigrants successfully incorporate into U.S. politics, and thus polarization may characterize the political behavior of new American citizens.

Abstract:

With rising income and wealth inequality, demand for redistribution might be expected to increase. However, public opinion on these issues has remained relatively stable in recent years. Concomitantly, the ethno-racial composition of the country has rapidly changed. Theories on ethnic diversity and racial threat predict such dynamics may reduce support for redistribution despite rising inequality, which would explain why support for redistribution remains stagnant in the U.S. We test these theories by  pairing local demographic data with national public opinion surveys of nearly a million Americans, including 3 panels of individuals who were interviewed multiple times between 2010 and 2022. Changes in neighborhood demographics do not significantly influence fiscal and social policy preferences. We rule out several sources of heterogeneity, conduct various sensitivity analyses, and replicate our findings using survey experiments and perceived measures of demographic change. These null results clash with established findings on diversity, intergroup conflict, and public finance.

Abstract:

Profound inequalities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals persist to this day in settler colonial societies across the world. Reconciliation requires collective acknowledgment of past harm and reparative measures to redress it. However, this process can prove challenging among the mass public due to widespread misapprehensions about, and animus toward, Indigenous populations. But what happens when citizens are confronted with information about the prevalence and extent of ongoing structural inequalities? Leveraging the case of Canada, we argue raising awareness about these issues should reduce misinformation and prejudice, and ultimately help make progress toward a meaningful reconciliation process. We field a national survey of 3,000 non-Indigenous Canadians to test two distinct informational interventions commonly used in the misinformation and prejudice reduction literatures: fact-checking and perspective-getting narratives. Both treatments promote recognition of inequality and support for policy reforms while countering anti-Indigenous resentment. Additionally, our interventions appear to foster advocative behavior in the form of an anonymous note addressed to the House of Commons of Canada. Overall, fact-checking appears most effective at shifting awareness and behavior, whereas narratives more successfully increase support for actual policy change. Surprisingly, combining both interventions produces unanticipated backlash effects, with each treatment canceling the other out. These nuanced findings contribute to the study of reconciliation and pave the way forward for advocates of reparations by identifying promising strategies to rally support among the mass public.

Abstract:

A wealth of research over the last decade has documented the causes and consequences of what it has termed a "globalization backlash." A recurring claim in this literature is that local exposure to globalization, as measured for instance with import penetration and foreigner influxes, has led to rising nationalism, populism, isolationism, protectionism, and xenophobia among the mass public. This paper synthesizes and re-evaluates the empirical implications of these findings. Leveraging 17 years of national surveys covering 600,000 unique respondents and 300 policy items, we estimate associations between a range of contextual indicators of globalization exposure and individual preferences over trade, immigration, international cooperation, and the military. Contrary to prevailing expectations, we observe minimal effects of contextual variables on public mood on globalization. This challenges a popular narrative and provides support for the argument that the backlash is due to issue polarization rather than public opinion swings against globalization.

Abstract:

A venerable supposition in American politics is that identity can effectively mobilize the electorate. Consequently, outreach efforts to non-white voters often emphasize racialized themes such as immigration, the criminal justice system, and affirmative action. But this strategy usually alienates socially conservative white voters. Moreover, polls consistently show economic messaging on bread-and-butter issues like jobs, taxes, and inflation can rival identity appeals across racial groups. My dissertation explores when and why voters prioritize identity over economics. Building on theories from psychology, political economy, and sociology, I argue identity politics is akin to a luxury good few can afford, appealing primarily to the well-off. The first paper demonstrates high-income, highly educated voters have fueled the polarization of racial attitudes and the centrality of identity in national elections at the expense of class politics. The second paper shows affluent Democrats drive support for minority candidates, sometimes prioritizing symbolic representation over substantive policy change. The third paper ascertains the appeal of social justice lexicon, revealing its popularity among white liberals but its alienation of marginalized groups. By showing identity politics caters mostly to affluent voters, I contend the path to racial progress goes through economic prosperity.

Abstract:

Are immigrants pro-immigrant? Given their own experiences and identity, we might expect immigrants to favor policies that favor other immigrants. However, recent findings challenge this assumption, particularly when it comes to naturalized immigrants who often place great importance on adherence to the same immigration rules and procedures they had to follow. This paper examines recent trends in U.S. immigrants' attitudes toward immigration focusing on significant changes that occurred during the Trump years. We leverage data from the Cooperative Election Study (2006-2024) of nearly 50,000 immigrant respondents to implement event study analyses. The results reveal that while naturalized citizens initially held more pro-immigrant stances than those with no immigration background, their views shifted dramatically during Trump’s 2016 campaign and subsequent presidency, becoming most conservative by 2018. This trend was especially pronounced in the area of unauthorized immigration, where naturalized citizens exhibited a sharper restrictionist turn than any other group. By documenting this period of political change, our findings highlight how anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy shifts may cause previously pro-immigrant groups to reposition, contributing to a growing body of research on how political environments shape immigrants' preferences over immigration policy.